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“One should be taxed by law, and not be untaxed by concession”, Vestey v. Inland Revenue 
Commissioners per Walton, J. [1979] 1 ch. 177 at 197.    
 
 
 
 
I. Abstract  
 
The area of inquiry of this dissertation is the interaction of the EU state aid rules and the tax 
treatment of the multinational companies. It analyses the substantive EU state aid law and its 
relevance to corporate taxation, the procedural aspects of the state aid policy and the 
consequences of unlawful aid. In light of the recent EU inquiries of the (beneficial) tax treatment 
of the multinationals, it also discusses the decisional practice of the Commission, with reference 
to cases where favourable application of OECD transfer-pricing methods amounted to state aid. 
It also endeavours to discuss the sui generis anti-avoidance rationale of the EU state aid 
inquiry.  
 
The widened scope of the EU state aid scrutiny over corporate tax (Gibraltar) provides the 
Commission with efficient supervision tools over the design and administrative implementation 
of the tax measures. The burden of proof and justification for selective (tax ruling - based) 
treatment of the multinational companies lies with the member states.  
 
This work also examines the corporate tax position of the multinationals, by using the example 
of Apple, and will try to argue that overhaul of the international tax rules would mitigate the 
essential problems underlying the EU state aid inquiry. Thus, the contentious transfer-pricing 
issue will be discussed de lege ferenda.  
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II. Introduction  
 
II (a). The scope of EU Corporate Tax Law 
 
Within the legal realm of the European Union, direct (business) taxation is an area of exclusive 
competence of the member states. Under the principle of attribution of powers, EU does not 
have competence in direct tax law.1 The basis for harmonisation is Article 115 TFEU, which in 
the reality of divergent national tax base and rates is hard to achieve, as it requires unanimity. 
The area of indirect taxation (i.e. VAT and customs duties), on the other hand is harmonised at 
EU level, leaving the member states with virtually no room for national manoeuvre apart from 
giving effect to the secondary European law (directives, decisions, etc.). Member states have 
preserved their sovereignty in direct tax, alongside the right to veto any proposal in this area. 
This renders the EU with treaty competence to legislate in direct taxation in accordance with the 
principle of subsidiarity, and in line with the internal market objectives.2 The decisions on the 
direction of the national tax policy, the tax base and basis of assessment, tax rates, rules on 
depreciation, and many other aspects of the national fiscal structure remain fully under authority 
of the member states’ governments.  
 
When structuring direct tax measures, however, member states are obliged to comply with EU 
law and in particular avoid any form of discrimination or restriction in cross-border business 
operations within the internal market.3 The EU founding treaties have been interpreted by the 
ECJ to confer directly enforceable rights to individuals and companies, which can be relied upon 
as part of domestic law, and cannot be overridden by subsequent acts of national parliaments.4  
 
The relationship of EU law with the double-tax treaties is also unique to the European legal 
order. Given the dual nature of the double tax treaties (being simultaneously instruments of both 
international and domestic law), their legal status depends on the domestic legal system and the 
method it gives effect to international law.5 On the other hand, the double tax treaties cannot 
escape the scrutiny of the ECJ in the light of their effects to EU fundamental freedoms and the 
                                               
1 Apart from the taxation of the employment income of EU officials, Council Regulation 260/68; Terra, 
Wattel (2012), op.cit.   
2 Panayi (2014), p.5, op.cit.  
3 Manninen, para 19, Commission v France, para 21 
4 Supremacy and direct effect of European law, Costa v Enel; Van Gend En Loos 
5 Baker (1994), op.cit.; Jones, and Baker, Bulletin for International Taxation 60.1 (2006): 19 
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discrimination concept (national treatment principle).6 Member states must exercise their 
competences in direct tax consistently with EU law, and in particular, must not introduce or 
maintain legislation that entails state aid or discrimination.7 
 
It is well established that EU law looks at the double tax treaties from an ‘internal market’ 
perspective.8 International tax law and the OECD model are focused on double juridical 
taxation, where Article 7 covers double juridical taxation of business profits or, same stream of 
income being taxed by two or more states in hands of the same taxpayer for identical periods. 
Article 9 is focused on providing relief from double economic taxation to associated entities, and 
also guaranteeing a reasonable allocation of the taxing rights between the states.9  Article 9(1) 
however, does not provide relief from all forms of double economic taxation; presumably leaving 
a solution to discretion of the treaty signatories.10  
 
EU has legislated in direct tax under the veil that the increased tax burden resulting from double 
economic taxation creates inefficiencies and distortions.11  
 
The Parent-Subsidiary Directive aims to remove any disadvantages to grouping of companies at 
EU and member states level by way of ensuring neutrality.12 This aim is achieved by eliminating 
withholding taxes on dividend distribution between subsidiaries and parent companies within the 
European Union13.   
 
Under the original directive, profits made by cross-border groups were relieved of double 
economic taxation, ensuring they are not put at a disadvantage compared to domestic groups. 
The amended Parent-Subsidiary Directive limits the relief granted to cross-border distributions 
in relation to the hybrid loans (financial instruments that have characteristics of both equity and 
debt), where the characterisation of such payments to tax deductible debt can result in double-
                                               
6 O’Shea (2008), op.cit.; Columbus Container, para 46  
7 Glaxo Wellcome, para 34  
8 Kerckhaert Morres para 21, 22; cited in O’Shea, op.cit.  
9 Commentary on Article 9, para 5 and Commentary on Article 23, para 1, OECD Model 
10 I.e. where the income is taxable in one state, and the related expenditure not deductible in the other 
state, Wittendorf (2010), p.149.; op.cit.  
11 Panayi (2014), op.cit.  
12 Cobelfret, para 30  
13 Articles 3 and 4 of the Parent-Subsidiary Directive  
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non taxation. Member states now ought to refrain from taxing profits from the subsidiary only to 
the extent that such profits are not tax deductible by the subsidiary.14  
 
The Merger Directive aims to eliminate fiscal obstacles to cross - border mergers; partial 
divisions (split offs), exchange of shares etc., and any increase in value of shares should not be 
taxed until their actual disposal.15 The Interest and Royalties Directive exempts from taxation 
any interests and royalties arising from an EU member state, under the condition that the 
beneficial owner of the interest and royalties is an EU company or PE located in another 
member state.16  
 
Multinational companies are thus increasingly faced with the EU corporate tax law, and the 
conventional cross-border structuring of their business operations faces a different compliance 
layer, as this dissertation will try to illustrate.  The substantive tax law of the member states, as 
well as the administrative practices often fall within the vast scope of the EU state aid law, and 
multinationals cannot escape such scrutiny even where they obtain tax rulings that guarantee 
how the tax administration would treat certain transactions or operations.  
 
The problem with the taxation of the multinational companies in the context of the application of 
the EU state aid rules is closely connected with the tax rulings that secure a (favourable) 
domestic tax treatment.  The transfer-pricing arrangements agreed with such rulings have been 
identified by the Commission as source of discretion, and thus, selective measures that give rise 
to state aid.   
 
II (b). Background to the EU State aid policy and its relevance to taxation 
 
The state aid rules form part of the EU competition law, whose rationale is to secure free and 
unimpeded competition within the EU internal market. Under the EU state aid law, the 
Commission and ECJ are entitled to scrutinise the national tax measures that are not general in 
nature or whose discretionary application confers selective advantages to certain undertakings. 
The underlying logic behind this policy is that ill-designed tax rules or administrative discretion in 
the application of the tax law cause distortive effects to the level playing field in the EU internal 
market. Given that 44% of the state aid is allocated by tax measures, it does not come as a 
                                               
14 With transposition deadline 31 December 2015; Council Conclusions 10419/14 of 3 June 2014  
15 Leur-Bloem, para 45, Kofoed, para 32 
16 Article 1(1) of the Interest and Royalties Directive  
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surprise that EU institutions are increasingly perceived as regulators of national policy decisions 
related to tax incentives.17  
 
The EU state aid rules were developed mainly by the decisional practice of the European 
Commission and the jurisprudence of the ECJ, in effect operationalising Article 107(1) TFEU, 
which is the substantive EU law provision on state aid: 
 
“Save as otherwise provided in the treaties, any aid granted by a member state or through state 
resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring 
certain undertakings or the production of certain goods shall, in so far as it affects trade 
between member states, be incompatible with the internal market.” 
 
In 1998, EU undertook a comprehensive action to regulate the area of state aid and taxation, in 
order to provide national governments and businesses with a clear regulatory approach and 
operationalization of Art. 107(1) TFEU. This resulted in a Notice on the application of the state 
aid rules to measures relating to direct business taxation.18 Apart from the work on the tax 
incentives, as a parallel process, the EU in 1997 started its work on the harmful tax competition, 
which resulted in Code of Conduct for Business Taxation, which alongside Art. 107 (1), is used 
to assess the tax competition instruments and state aid. The Code of Conduct, however, is a 
political declaration of the member states to tackle the harmful tax competition and commitment 
to more transparency, as demonstrated by the EU Council of ministers’ conclusions.19 In March 
1998, the Code of Conduct Group (Primarolo Group) was compiled, consisting of member 
states high representatives and the European Commission, with powers to examine the harmful 
tax practices of the Member states and give recommendations to the Council.20 The present 
work covers tax rulings in the transfer pricing area (advance pricing agreements), the 
discretionary aspects of the tax rulings and the patent boxes.21  
                                               
17 Hancher (2013), p. 322 
18 On the legal status of the Notice, the ECJ pronounced itself in a few cases, most recently in Gibraltar, 
para 128; This Notice will be repealed by the (draft) Notice on the notion of State aid pursuant to Article 
107(1) TFEU; infra at fn. 23 
19 Council Resolution of 1 December 1997, Official Journal C 2 of 6 January 1998 (OJ 98/C 2/01) 
20 Code of Conduct Group's initial work covered 250 potentially harmful regimes and 66 harmful regimes 
of EU member states and dependent or associated territories, J. Tilstra, Oxford Summer Tax Conference 
(2014) 
21 Some royalty regimes were formally cleared (France and Hungary), for others there is no need to 
assess against the Code’s criteria (Spain, Belgium, Netherlands and Luxembourg). Cyprus, United 
Kingdom and Belgium (amendment) are the recently notified patent boxes to the European Commission, 
J. Tilstra, Oxford Summer Tax Conference (2014) 
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It is in the wake of the OECD BEPS discussions, that the European Commission revamped the 
state aid investigations of the potential incentive regimes, as envisaged by paragraph “J” of the 
Code of conduct. Some of the tax measures under investigation may well fall under both the EU 
state aid rules (Article 107 TFEU) and the Code of conduct as harmful tax competition.22 
 
Member states are free to enter into tax competition when they draft national tax policy and 
legislation, which is again constrained by the coordinating EU powers in order to prevent any 
harmful tax practices. The competition between business entities, on the other hand, must be 
preserved and encouraged as an essential assumption of the EU state aid policy. To that end, 
the Commission engaged in modernisation of the state aid monitoring mechanisms and 
clarification of the notion of state aid, which was subject of public consultation in the early 2014 
resulting in draft Notice on state aid and business taxation.23  
 
The interaction between EU state aid law and the international tax law becomes increasingly 
important, as both tend to achieve complementary aims - level playing field and relief of double 
taxation, with anti-avoidance in its fiscal meaning (prevention of double non-taxation) being the 
lowest common denominator for both.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
22 Tilstra argued that the Code of conduct effectively eliminated the harmful tax practices within the EU, J. 
Tilstra, Oxford Summer Tax Conference (2014)  
22 Idem 
23 Consultation on the Notice on the notion of State aid and Communication from the Commission—Draft 
Commission Notice on the notion of State aid pursuant to Article 107(1) TFEU (the Communication) 
23 Idem 
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III. Procedural aspects of the European State Aid system  
 
Under EU law, it is exclusive competence of the European Commission to assess the 
compatibility of the national measures with the state aid rules.  The Treaty basis for assessment 
are Articles 107 and 108 TFEU. Article 107(1) declares incompatible with EU law:  
 
“...any aid granted by a member state through state resources in any form whatsoever, which 
distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of 
certain goods…, insofar as it affects the trade between the member states.” 
The prohibition of state aid is not absolute, so aid having a social character or aid for areas hit 
by natural disasters or exceptional circumstances is considered compatible with the internal 
market.24  
However, if the aid amounts to less than 200.000 Euros in three fiscal years, it then falls under 
the de minimis rule. Such aid is deemed insufficient to entail distortionary effects to the EU 
internal market and is considered acceptable amount of aid.25 The Commission has powers to 
approve aid that may be compatible with the internal market, such as aid to promote economic 
development of underdeveloped regions. State aid of such nature is acceptable as long as it 
does not affect trading conditions and competition in the Union, as well as aid in other forms that 
may be approved by joint decision of the Council and the Commission.26  
The state aid scrutiny follows a standard procedure: the Commission performs an assessment 
of the measure, and investigates whether the proposed aid measure infringes other EU law 
provisions. It is bound by its own authorisation practice to ensure equal procedural rights, 
subject to review by ECJ.27  
The Treaty prescribes Commission powers in relation to procedural treatment of new state aid 
in Article 108 (1) and (2) TFEU. These, alongside Procedural Regulation28 differentiate between 
existing aid and new aid. When EU law refers to existing aid, it concerns state aid which was put 
into effect before a member state acceded to the EU, and is considered to be lawful, unless the 
                                               
24 Art. 107(2) TFEU prescribes ex lege exemptions to the state aid prohibition  
25 Regulation on the application of Articles 107 and 108 TFEU to de minimis aid, Regulation 1998/2006 
OJ L379 of 28 December 2006 
26 Article 107(2) TFEU  
27 Lang et al. (2013), p.119, op.cit. 
28 Regulation 734/2013 of 22 June 2013 OJ2103 L204/15; cited in Faull and Nikpay (2014), op.cit.  
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Commission declares it illegal aid following a formal investigation under Article 108(2) TFEU. 
For the new aid, an aid put in practice following the accession of a member state to the 
European union Article 108(3) TFEU applies, which means that formal authorisation from the 
Commission is needed before a new aid is given effect.29  Also, under the Procedural 
Regulation, Commission’s investigative powers have also been expanded and it can now 
request information from undertakings under threat of fines for non-compliance. 
If an existing aid is declared incompatible with the internal market, such a decision has ex nunc 
effect, and the aid will be recoverable only if the member state proceeds with the practice.30 The 
procedural treatment of new aid is different. There is an obligation on member states to inform 
the Commission on any plans to grant state aid. As mentioned before, this obligation is 
constrained by the direct blocking effect of Article 108(3) TFEU that prohibits the implementation 
of any aid until the Commission has reached its decision. Unlike Article 107(1) TFEU, article 
108(3) is directly effective and the ban on implementation on notified, but yet not cleared state 
aid can be challenged (by interested third party, competitor etc.) before national courts by 
directly invoking this EU law provision.31  
The treatment of unnotified and unlawful aid is different from the procedural treatment of 
unnotified, but lawful aid. Article 14 of the Procedural Regulation authorises the Commission to 
request from the member state immediate recovery of any unlawful aid that was declared 
incompatible with the internal market, in accordance with the national procedural rules.32 The 
procedural treatment of the recovery involves two acts:  
●  Act of the Commission requesting the member state to recover the incompatible aid; 
and 
● Act of the member state on the recovery of the state aid, which may be challenged by 
the aid beneficiary before the competent national court.  
 
The act of the Commission may be challenged before ECJ, but the legal action brought against 
a negative decision of the Commission does not have suspensory effect under Article 278 
TFEU. A fundamental principle of the recovery according to Article 14(3) of the Procedural 
regulation is that aid must be repaid with interest. On the question how much aid is recoverable 
in cases where the tax advantage or the tax incentive cannot be quantified with precision, it is 
                                               
29 This is the direct blocking effect of Art. 108(3), idem 
30 Idem 
31 Idem, citing Lorenz ECR 1471, para 8 
32 France v Commission, para 11, cited in Lang et al. (2013), op.cit.  
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for the member states to make this calculation. In doing so, national courts are under obligation 
to cooperate with the European Commission under Article 4(3) TFEU. The recovery is normally 
effectuated in cash payment, or exceptionally, by converting debt into equity, whereby the state 
receives shares in the aid beneficiary company in exchange for recovery of the debt. The 
valuation of the equity share is done under market conditions, as overvaluation of the equity 
may trigger a new state aid investigation.33  
 
The Commission often classifies a tax incentive as ‘operating aid’, which is in principle 
prohibited, unless it falls under the de minimis Regulation. Operating aid covers the expenses 
which a company should normally pay in the course of its business, such as rates, rent, utilities 
bills, etc.34  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
33 Faull and Nikpay (2014), p. 2012, op.cit.  
34 HM Government, State Aid, Department for Business Innovations & Skills (2013) 
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IV. Substantive aspects of the prohibited state aid in taxation  
 
Schoen illustrates the state aid notion with a basic situation where the state reaches into its 
pocket and hands out money or other funds to a single or group of enterprises, thus interfering 
in the internal market.35 The situation with the fiscal state aid is often more complicated, as the 
state is asked to exercise fully its powers to tax in order to secure level-playing. It should be 
underlined that the concept of state aid is objective and legally defined by the Treaty. Primary 
reference for interpreting the state aid concept is always the ECJ case-law, and the Commission 
is bound by these interpretations.36  
 
Four cumulative criteria define the substantive scope of Article 107(1) TFEU, under which fiscal 
state aid can be deemed incompatible with the internal market: 
 
(a) The measure must confer a (tax) advantage to the aid beneficiary; 
(b) The (tax) advantage must be granted by the state or using state resources; 
(c) The measure must affect competition and trade between the member states of the 
EU internal market; 
(d) The advantage granted must favour certain undertakings or the production of certain 
goods (selectivity or specificity of the aid).37 
 
 
IV (a). Tax advantage for the beneficiary 
 
To confer a tax advantage in the meaning of Article 107(1) TFEU, the measure itself does not 
necessarily have to be a tax measure, as the treaty provision applies to aid measures ‘in any 
form whatsoever’. It must instead “confer on the recipient an advantage which relieves them of 
the charges that are normally borne from their budgets”.38 It is therefore any economic benefit 
which an undertaking would not have obtained under normal market conditions i.e. in absence 
of state intervention.39  
                                               
35 Schoen in Hancher (2012), p.328, op.cit.   
36 Commission v Scott para 66  
37 Article 107(1) TFEU and Notice on direct business taxation  
38 Notice on direct business taxation, para 9 
39 Spain v Commission, para 41  
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An advantage can take various forms, such as: reduction of the tax bases through special 
deductions or accelerated depreciation, reduction of the amount of tax payable (through 
exemptions or credits), deferral or cancellation of the tax debt etc. ECJ has said that negative 
interventions, that in various forms reduce the tax burden ordinarily born by the undertaking, are 
also considered a tax advantage.40 
 
Thus, the neutral concept ‘any form whatsoever’ used in the Treaty means that not only direct 
payments and state guarantees, but also exemptions or mitigations of charges that have the 
same effect and are similar in character as the positive aid are prohibited under article 107(1) 
TFEU.41 For the tax measure to confer an advantage, it must be selective (see infra), i.e. to 
confer advantage to the undertaking in comparison to other market participants.42 
 
IV(a)(i). Favourable application of the cost-plus method as tax advantage  
 
International tax law (OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax 
Administrations), sees the cost-plus pricing as a traditional transactional taxation method. Under 
this method, the profit between associate parties is determined by first, calculating the costs 
incurred by the supplier of goods and services in the controlled transaction (i.e. provision of 
services to the related entity) and adding a mark-up percentage for the functions performed in 
accordance with the market conditions. The mark-up should use a comparable uncontrolled 
transaction (“internal comparable”), or in case the supplier does not enter into a comparable 
transaction, using a mark-up that would have been earned in comparable transactions by an 
independent enterprise (an “external comparable”).43 According to HMRC, using the cost-plus 
method to determine the profits for i.e. intra-group services in transactions between associated 
entities is “uncontroversial and recommended by the OECD Guidelines”.44  
 
The Commission sees cost-plus as an alternative tax method. The taxable income is seen as 
regularly calculated with a reference to the difference between the revenues and expenses of 
                                               
40 Adria Wien, para 38 
41 Lang et al. (2013), p. 103, op.cit.  
42 Adria-Wien, para 41 
43 Applying the cost-plus method, the mark-up on costs that the manufacturer or service provider earns 
from the controlled transaction is compared with the mark-up on costs from comparable uncontrolled 
transactions; OECD Guidelines; HMRC, Transfer pricing: Methodologies: OECD Guidelines: Cost plus 
44 Idem 
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an entity. The characterisation of the cost-plus pricing method as “traditional” by OECD, and 
“alternative” by the Commission is important as it illustrates the conceptual difference in the 
arguments, and is pivotal for the legal analysis related to the concept of selective tax 
advantage.45  
 
Having in mind that the concept of selective tax advantage is not prima facie objective, the 
Commission has regularly challenged the ‘favourable’ application of the OECD transfer-pricing 
methods, as to whether it amounts to prohibited state aid or remains completely outside of its 
scope.46  
 
In Forum 187, ECJ upheld Commission’s view that the ‘favourable’ application of international 
tax law concepts, such as the use of flat-rate assessment of income under the cost-plus 
method, amounts to tax advantage.47 Here, the taxable income of Forum 187, a multinational 
group established as coordination centre under the Belgian special tax regime, was assessed 
using a flat-rate application of the cost plus method.48 
 
In order to decide whether a method of assessment of taxable income confers an advantage to 
the taxpayer, ECJ analysed, it is necessary to compare such regime with the ordinary tax 
system. The flat-rate assessment thus meant that staff costs and financial costs were excluded 
from the taxable base of the coordination centres, enabling them to earn revenue, particularly 
when their revenues come from financial services. The exclusion of such costs amounted to tax 
advantage for these multinationals.49  
 
The Commission’s arguments regarding the ‘flat-rate assessment’ were upheld by ECJ in 
Forum 187. ECJ essentially held that it is not the transfer-pricing methodology that is challenged 
under the state aid scrutiny of the multinationals, but its discretionary application, and the 
advantageous treatment such discretion accords.  
 
                                               
45 Decision 2003/757/EC of 17 February 2003 (Belgium- Coordinating Centres)  
46 Schoen in Hancher (2012), p. 351, op.cit.  
47 Kingdom of Belgium and Forum 187 v European Commission, paras 90-91 
48 The Commission uses interchangeably the terms ‘safe harbour’, ‘flat-rate assessment of income’ or 
‘fixed margin’, for the tax assessments under the cost-plus method which use fixed mark-up, instead of 
variable mark-up, in accordance with the economic reality, as suggested by the OECD Transfer-Pricing 
Guidelines 
49 Forum 187, paras 95-97 
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IV (a) (ii) Legitimate expectations 
 
Commission’s Decision was, however, annulled on grounds of ‘legitimate expectations’, which 
the coordination centres maintained, regarding the renewal of their authorisations.50 Forum 187 
argued that Commission’s inconsistency in approval of certain coordination centres in the years 
1984 and 1987, led to expectation that EU law did not preclude renewal of their status as 
coordination centre.51 ECJ agreed, explaining that the principle of equal treatment was 
breached - comparable situations must not be treated differently, unless objectively justified.52  
 
Under this notion, EU law has offered protection to the business entities, where actions on 
behalf of EU authorities have caused expectations which are justified.53 On the other hand, if ‘a 
prudent and alert economic operator’ could have foreseen an adoption of a measure, they 
cannot plead the legitimate expectations.54  
 
On that note, even though it seems that the boundaries of the concept of legitimate expectations 
in state aid remains somewhat vague, as illustrated in Forum 187, this concept can be invoked 
when challenging Commission’s state aid decisions. It does offer (increased) legal certainty for 
taxpayers, with considerable prospects of successful legitimate expectations claim.55   
 
 
IV (a)(iii) Inconsistent application of Article 23 - (double tax relief methods) as tax 
advantage    
 
Under a measure related to cross-border repatriation of dividends that Ireland implemented, the 
foreign sourced passive income (repatriated for purposed of investment or promotion of the 
employment) was exempt from taxation.56 Under the ordinary tax rules, Ireland provided relief 
from double juridical taxation by applying the credit method. Although article 23 OECD Model 
provides for both the exemption and credit methods as means for eliminating double taxation, 
                                               
50 Forum 187, paras 166-167 
51 Forum 187, paras 151- 167 
52 Forum 187, para 170  
53 Germany v Commission, para 58 
54 Van den Bergh en Jurgens v Commission, para 44 
55 Several commentators have suggested that taxpayers should abandon all hopes of succeeding in 
invoking legitimate expectations; in Giraud (2008), 45 C.M.L.R. (5), pp. 1399–1431 
56 Decision of 17 February 2003 on aid scheme Ireland- Foreign Income C54/2001 (OJ L204) 
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the Commission found that the application of the exemption method as relief from double 
taxation for the repatriated cross-border dividend amounted to illegal state aid.57 The 
Commission accepted that both methods are acceptable for providing relief from double taxation 
on corporate income, but the result is different: under the credit method, the tax paid abroad can 
be deducted up to the level of the domestic tax liability, while under the exemption method no 
domestic corporate tax would be due. The Commission considered that the exemption of the 
cross-border income constitutes tax advantage for a number of companies, as the (regular) 
application of the credit method would result in tax liability for the other companies falling 
outside the scope of the Irish tax scheme.58   
 
In relation to the relief from double economic taxation, in Cobelfret, ECJ has interpreted article 
4(1) of the Parent-Subsidiary Directive in a way that allows member states to opt for any relief 
method as long as they (conditionally) refrain from taxing dividends, but cannot rely on the 
effects that might have arisen from the implementation of the other system.59  
 
Where EU has no harmonising powers, such as the policy choice between domestic or treaty 
provided relief from double taxation, the member states can follow the internationally accepted 
tax practice embodied in the OECD Model.60 But the discretionary application of international 
tax law concepts, such the methods for double tax relief can under certain circumstances 
amount to a tax advantage, which is one of the criteria for a tax regime to be considered 
unlawful state aid under the European Union law.61   
 
 
IV (a)(iv) Selective anti-abuse rules as state aid (effects of legislation) 
 
Decision 2009/809/EC concerned the assessment of the Dutch ‘interest box regime’, which, 
according to the Dutch government, was an anti-abuse measure aimed at reducing the 
                                               
57 Ireland argued that the aim of the relief was to repatriate the dividends in order to promote employment, 
not to promote the trading operations of the subsidiaries. If no dividends were brought back to Ireland, no 
Irish tax liability would arise in respect to the foreign subsidiaries; the incentive being that no additional 
tax would arise, had the dividends been repatriated, Decision C54/2001, paras 18-19  
58 Idem, paras 33-34 
59 Cobelfret, para 50  
60 Test Claimants in the Thin Cap Group Litigation, para 49 
61 Decision 2009/809/EC, para 35 
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difference in the tax treatment between the equity and debt as intra-group financing tools.62 The 
deductibility of the interest at the level of the recipient company, and the non-deductibility of the 
dividends creates an arbitrage that distorts the neutrality of the system, as decisions are not 
made for economic, but for tax planning reasons. The measure should have encouraged 
companies to limit the interest deductions by using equity instead of debt as financing 
instrument, thus limiting the interest deductions in the Netherlands and preventing artificial 
reduction of the tax base.63 Given the general and technical nature of the measure, it was 
subsumed under the derogations from the prohibited state aid rules.64  
 
The Commission confirmed the reasoning of the Dutch tax authorities, and explained, “any 
advantage arising in cross-border context beyond the advantage obtained in a national context 
is the result not of the lower Dutch rate for intra-group interest received, but the result of 
unlimited deduction for intra-group interest paid abroad.”65 However, the question of tax 
advantage of the measure was assessed against the whole group as point of reference, and in 
relation to the effects, not the causes or aims.   
 
Where the anti-abuse rules are found to be selective, this can amount to prohibited state aid. 
The Decision 2007/256/EC concerned two provisions of the French Tax Code aimed at 
combating tax avoidance by partnerships and economic interest groupings when they carry out 
movable asset financing operations. The disputed provision provided that tax-deductible 
depreciation of an asset leased out by an EIG may not exceed the amount of any leasing 
charges collected by it, less any other charges relating to the asset. The ceiling on depreciation 
provided for Tax Code was intended to combat abusive recourse to this type of financing for the 
purpose of tax avoidance.66 
 
The Commission found that the measure was selective. Even when measures pursue legitimate 
policy objectives such as combating tax avoidance (effectuated through the abuse of movable 
asset financing operations by tax-transparent structures), such objectives are not capable of 
being excluded from the classification of state aid.  The selective nature of the measure was not 
                                               
62 According to the Dutch authorities this was a measure supplementing the thin-capitalisation rules; It 
worked by providing different tax treatment for certain intra-group interest, Decision 2009/809/EC, para 21  
63 Decision 2009/809/EC, paras 16-18 
64 Notice on direct business taxation, para 13 
65 Decision 2009/809/EC, para 113 
66 Decision 2007/256/EC on the French aid scheme under Article 39CA of the General Tax Code  
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considered consistent with Article 107(1), inasmuch as that provision does not distinguish 
between measures by reference to their causes, but defines them in relation to their effects.67  
 
It is now considered settled settled-case law that anti-abuse as a policy objective of a measure 
does not suffice to exclude such (selective) measures outright from classification as state aid.68  
 
When the anti-abuse legislation has an effect of non-application to specific undertakings (de 
facto material selectivity), that cannot be consistent with the underlying logic of the anti-
avoidance policy objectives. Thus, it is not the wording, intention or causes of the anti-abuse 
rules that matters, but the effects, and only measures of general nature can be in line with the 
objectives of Article 107(1) TFEU.  
 
IV.(b). The advantage granted through state resources  
 
When scrutinising the business tax measures against article 107(1) TFEU, it must be 
established that the advantage was granted through state resources. Loss of tax revenue is 
considered equivalent to consumption of state resources in form of fiscal expenditure.69 Also, 
state resources may be transferred to the beneficiaries, not only through advantages provided 
via legislative or regulatory action, but through the (discretionary) practices of the tax 
authorities.70    
 
ECJ has repeatedly held that the definition of state aid is more general than that of subsidy as it 
encompasses not only positives benefits, but also measures that mitigate the charges which are 
normally due by the undertaking and which although not being subsidies themselves, have 
similar character and effect.71 Thus, a measure which grants to certain undertakings favourable 
tax treatment (does not grant state resources per se), but places the recipients in a more 
favourable financial position in comparison with other market participants, constitutes state 
aid.72  
 
 
                                               
67 Decision 2007/256/EC, para 138 
68 Netherlands v Commission, para 51  
69 Notice on business taxation, para 10; Germany v. Commission [1987] ECR 4013 
70 Notice, para 10 
71 Adria Wien, para 38 
72 Gibraltar, para 72 
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IV.(b)(i) Beneficial treatment offset with economic advantage  
 
In Commission’s decision regarding the Belgian coordination centres, the Belgian government 
argued that the beneficial tax treatment of the multinational groups classified as coordination 
centres was offset with the advantage that those companies invested in Belgium and 
contributed to the Belgian state resources. The Dutch government used the same argument to 
defend its beneficial treatment of the finance companies.73 These arguments were rejected by 
the Commission, on grounds that the ‘state resources criterion’ cannot be stretched to analysis 
of the indirect economic or budgetary benefits of the investments.74 It transpires that by granting 
a tax concession the state forgoes revenue to the benefit of a private undertaking, and this must 
be assessed in light of the recipient’s individual situation. ECJ has accepted Commission’s 
observations that transfer of state resources can take many forms such as, direct grants, 
guarantees, benefits of any kind, including waiver of revenue, which should have otherwise 
been paid to the state.75  
 
IV.(c). Effect on competition and trade between member states 
A tax measure can be declared illegal state aid when it affects competition and the trade 
between the member states. This is one of the straightforward criteria that the Commission sees 
satisfied when the competition is only potentially affected.76 An advantage granted to an 
undertaking in a market open to competition, potentially distorts trade between member states:  
 
“Where state aid strengthens the position of an undertaking as compared with other 
undertakings competing in intra-Community trade, the latter must be regarded as affected by 
the aid”.77 
 
In line with this reasoning, it is self-evident that the multinationals satisfy this criterion, as they 
operate cross-border. In the Decision on the Dutch aid scheme related to the finance 
companies, the Commission found this criterion satisfied, for the aid strengthened the financial 
position of the beneficiaries, most of which engaged in EU cross-border trade.78  ECJ confirmed 
that justifications cannot be invoked by referring to the tax systems of other member states, or 
                                               
73 Report on the implementation of the Commission’s Notice, para. 20 
74 Idem, para 20 
75 France v Ladbroke Racing Ltd and Commission, paras 48-51, Draft Notice p. 15 
76 Measures which ‘threaten to distort competition’ are also covered by Article 107(1) TFEU  
77 Friulia Venezia Giulia, paragraph 41 
78 Commission’s Report on the implementation of the notice on direct business taxation, para 23 
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existence of comparable tax measures in other states. The aid schemes must be therefore 
scrutinised in the context of the tax system of the member state concerned.79  
 
This conclusion seems to be at odds with the later practice of the European Commission, which 
has compared the situation in other member states in order to prove that the measure 
constitutes aid.80 However, this practice of the Commission probably follows earlier case law, 
where ECJ stated that in establishing a distortion of the competition, it is not necessary to define 
the market in order to investigate the impact of the measure on competition.81   
 
IV. (d)  Selectivity - decisive state aid criterion  
 
Selectivity is decisive criterion in establishing that a national tax measure constitutes unlawful 
state aid.82 Under article 107(1) TFEU a measure is selective when it “favours certain 
undertakings or the production of certain goods”. The selectivity element is less contentious in 
cases of positive aid, for it is obvious that an advantage is explicitly granted to an undertaking. 
In case of negative aid, the state grants reliefs to the beneficiary, which should be normally born 
by the undertaking’s budget.83  
 
The assessment of the selectivity of the measure involves analysis of the general tax system, 
because the selectivity has to be, in principle, established as a departure from the ordinary tax 
system. The application of the selectivity criterion in taxation can be analysed from different 
perspectives: 
 
● Material selectivity;  
● Regional (geographical) selectivity.84 
 
Material selectivity can concern de jure selectivity, where the legislation explicitly awards tax 
advantages to certain undertakings or de facto selectivity, where the advantage is not expressly 
                                               
79 Idem, para 24 citing Court of First Instance case T-214/95 Het Vlaamse Gewest v Commission ECR II-
717 
80 See, i.e. Decision 2003/809/EC, para 48  
81 Phillip Morris [1980] ECR 2671 
82 Faull and Nikpay (2014), p.1945 (para.17.95), op.cit.  
83 Idem 
84 Faull and Nikpay (2014), p.1947, op.cit.  
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awarded and case-by-case analysis beyond the wording of the measure is necessary to 
establish the selectivity.85  
 
Regional selectivity on the other hand involves a specific reduction of tax as part of the national 
tax system and is awarded by a local or regional authority.86   
 
The issue of selectivity lies at the heart of the division between the prohibited state aid and 
measures pursuing general economic or tax policy which are acceptable. The European 
Commission defined general tax measures as effectively open to all economic agents which 
operate at the market of one member state in equal access basis and could not be reduced in 
scope through de facto administrative actions that restrict their effects.87 Tax measures of purely 
technical nature (rules on tax rates, carry-forward of losses, depreciation rules, double-taxation 
and tax avoidance provisions) and tax measures which pursue general policy aims via reduction 
of the tax burden for costs of for certain activities do not constitute state aid.88 Tax incentives for 
investments in environmental or R&D favour certain activities, but they ‘do not necessarily 
constitute state aid’.89 
 
ECJ developed an (early case-law) tax selectivity test in the landmark judgment Italian Textile, 
where a tax measure was considered selective if it is intended to partially exempt undertakings 
from charges arising from the normal application of the general system of taxation. ECJ has 
since repeatedly held that selective advantages exist where a measure departs from the normal 
application of the tax system.90  
 
In order to ascertain whether a tax measure is selective by departing from the normal 
application of the tax system, it must be determined what is considered a common or normal 
system of taxation.91 
 
The selectivity of the measure can concern, i.e., the favouring of certain undertakings such as 
large companies. The case of the historical Basque regions analysed a tax concession involving 
                                               
85 Idem, p.1949 
86 Box No. 6, Report on the implementation of the notice on direct business taxation 
87 Notice, para 13  
88 Idem, para 13 
89 Idem, para 14 
90 Italian Textile, para 33; cited in Faull and Nikpay (2014), p. 1948, op.cit.  
91 Notice, para 16 
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a 45% tax credit of the cost of the new investment in fixed assets that exceeds 2.5 million then 
Spanish pesetas.92 The Commission challenged the scheme as it awarded selective tax 
advantages only to firms investing at least 2.5 million pesetas. The Commission also evidenced 
the selectivity of the tax credits with the discretionary powers of the tax administration of the 
Basque Provinces which they enjoy in granting the tax advantages.93 The court agreed that the 
measure is selective, as it effectively restricts the grant of the tax advantage to large 
companies.94 
 
In Adria-Wien ECJ scrutinised an Austrian tax measure which granted preferential tax treatment 
on the energy supply to undertakings manufacturing goods.95 Providers of services could not 
avail of these advantages, which meant that the measure is selective, and thus prohibited under 
the EU state aid rules. The Court dismissed Austria’s argument that large number of entities 
benefit from measure, as it was still favouring certain undertakings.  
 
ECJ also discussed justifications, explaining that although selective such a measure could be 
potentially justified under the nature or general scheme of that legislation.96 However, in this 
case, the service providers, who are also energy consumers, were taxed higher than the goods’ 
manufactures. Service providers incurred energy taxes at rates higher than 0.35% of the net 
production value, which is the threshold for the eligibility for the tax rebates.97  Thus, the Court 
classified this measure as selective aid prohibited under Article 107(1) TFEU, which was not 
justified under the nature or general scheme of that legislation.98 
 
It transpires from the ECJ’s reasoning in Adria-Wien that it is a departure from the normal tax 
system if the measure favours certain undertakings which are in comparable factual and legal 
situation in light of the objectives pursued by the tax measure in question (material selectivity).99 
The reference tax system for assessment of the material selectivity of the measure was the 
general (energy) tax regime.100 
 
                                               
92 Territorio Historico, para 11 
93 Territorio Historico, paras 19,20  
94 Territorio Historico , para 69 
95 Adria Wien, para 16 
96 Adria Wien, para 42 
97 Adria Wien, paras 50 and 52 
98 Adria Wien, para 53 
99 Faull and Nikpay (2014), p. 1949, op.cit.  
100 Idem 
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The General Court followed the Adria-Wien criteria in establishing that the material selectivity 
test for tax measures should be, in principle, established by means of a three step analysis:101  
 
 Defining a tax system as reference point; 
 Establishing whether the measure is considered a departure from the general tax 
system;102 
 If the measure appears prima facie selective, it is necessary to ascertain whether the 
measure can be justified by the logic, the nature of the general tax system that it is part 
of.103  
 
As seen from Adria-Wien, it is in principle important to establish the reference tax system in 
order to determine whether the measure is selective by departing from that system. The 
reference tax system can thus be the overall tax system, the corporation taxation, specific taxes 
in certain fields like environment or energy taxation etc.104  
 
On the other hand the Commission didn’t accept the Dutch measure allowing multinational 
finance companies to create a tax-free risk reserve under the condition that they pursue 
financing activities in four countries and two continents. The Commission elaborated that such 
measure is still selective and cannot be justified by the logic of the Netherlands tax system.105 
The burden of proof lies with the member states, which must demonstrate that the differences in 
the tax treatment are justified by the logic/ general scheme and nature of the system.106 
 
IV.(d)(i) Gibraltar- material selectivity revisited  
 
In the landmark case Gibraltar, ECJ revisited the concept of selectivity and redefined the width 
of the state aid examination of whole tax regimes.107 In essence, ECJ broadened the material 
                                               
101 Gibraltar, General Court cases T-195/01 and T-207/01 set aside by the Court of justice with judgment 
C-106/09  
102 Adria-Wien, para 41 
103 Idem  
104 Idem 
105 Decision of 17 February 2003 C51/2001, OJ 2003 L180/52 
106 Faull and Nikpay (2014), p. 195, op.cit.  
107 Government of Gibraltar v United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland Court of Justice C-
106/09  
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selectivity test (thus, the scope of Article 107 TFEU) with respect to ‘engineered’108 tax regimes, 
such as the corporate tax reform introduced by Gibraltar.  
 
The case concerned a tax reform proposed by the Government of Gibraltar which in essence, 
envisaged repealing of the old corporate tax system and replacing it with three taxes applicable 
to undertakings in Gibraltar: payroll tax, business property occupation charge payable by all 
companies occupying property in Gibraltar for business purposes, and annual registration fee 
for companies.109 ECJ found the measure materially selective, as it effectively exempt from 
taxation the offshore companies, thus amounting to state aid.110  
 
In the standard ECJ selectivity test (Adria Wien), a measure was considered materially selective 
when departing from the ordinary tax system. However, in Gibraltar, there was not derogation 
from the ordinary tax system, but the ‘normal’ tax system in effect favoured offshore companies. 
In such, exceptional cases, it is not necessary to determine the ordinary tax system and the 
departure, but to evaluate whether the tax system itself discriminates against certain 
undertakings in a comparable legal and factual situation.111  Thus, ECJ declared existence of 
material selectivity on the grounds that the corporation tax system of Gibraltar (the newly 
introduced, combined bases of assessment), although general in nature, excluded the offshore 
companies from taxation.112  
 
ECJ was obviously consistent in upholding the meaning of Article 107(1), by clarifying, first, that 
state aid measures will always be tested against the effects of the measure, not the regulatory 
technique used, and secondly, that Article 107(1) does not require identification of ‘normal’ 
system before determining selective advantages.113  This ‘methodological revolution in the 
application of the state aid rules’ was described as aimed at preventing avoidance of state aid 
law.114    
 
                                               
108 MEMO/11/784, European Commission, Brussels, November 15, 2011  
109 Gibraltar, paras 12, 21-25 of General Court judgment T-195/01 and T-207/01, set aside by ECJ with 
judgment C-106/09  
110 Gibraltar, para 111  
111 Gibraltar, para 87 
112 Gibraltar, paras 100-102 
113 Gibraltar, paras 87, 88 and 92  
114 Lyons, B.T.R. (1) 2012 
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Secondly, ECJ stipulated that the assessment whether the measure constitutes state aid should 
be made only in reference to Article 107(1) TFEU, and not in the light of the earlier decision-
making practice of the Commission.115 ECJ dismissed UK’s arguments that material selectivity 
can be established only by reference to the departure of the ordinary tax system (as prescribed 
by the Notice), declaring that the Notice is not a ‘rule of law’.116   
 
Finally, ECJ did not look whether the selective advantages offered to the offshore companies 
could be justified by the nature and general scheme of the system, as the applicants did not 
claim any justification.117 As discussed supra, ECJ stated in Gibraltar ECJ that the burden to 
justify the derogation from the ordinary tax system lies on the member state, thus neither can 
the Commission be criticised for not looking into any justifications. 118  
 
Certain materially selective measures can still be justified by the nature or general scheme of 
the referent tax system. Relief of double taxation, the need to tackle fraud or tax evasion, the tax 
neutrality and the redistributive and progressive nature of the income tax system have been 
accepted by ECJ as possible justifications.119  
 
When invoking justifications, member states are bound to the principle of proportionality, and 
are also under duty to ensure appropriate mechanisms that guarantee that the derogatory 
instruments are consistent with the internal logic of the tax system.120  
 
IV(d)(iii). Geographical selectivity (institutional, procedural and economic autonomy of 
infra-state bodies)   
 
Only rules applicable to geographical area of the whole country are considered general enough 
to escape the state aid selectivity classification. However, certain measures that apply to 
particular regions or areas of a member state can be considered acceptable. The criteria for 
such assessment were developed in Azores, specified in UGT-Rioja and upheld in Gibraltar.  
 
                                               
115 Idem, at para 136 
116 Gibraltar para 128  
117 Opinion of AG Leger in Netherlands v Commission C-159/01, para 65 
118 Gibraltar, paras 149-151 
119 Paint Graphos, para 69  
120 Paint Graphos, paras 74,75 
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The regional (geographical) selectivity deals with the issues whether a local authority 
introducing tax relief which is part of a national taxation system complies with article 107(1) 
TFEU. ECJ set an important precedent in the Azores where it scrutinised the tax advantages 
given to the undertakings located in the Azores. The main issue was the appropriate reference 
framework, or whether the tax measures should be assessed against the tax rules generally 
applicable to the whole territory of Portugal or against the tax regime applied only to the Azores.  
 
The measure involved reduction of corporation and income taxation by 10% to undertakings 
established in the Azores. Had the measure been assessed against the Portuguese tax system 
as a reference framework, it would have been considered regionally selective as it favoured 
certain undertakings (located in the Azores). ECJ confirmed the presence of selectivity by 
reference to the degree of autonomy of the infra-state body adopting the measures and in 
reference to the Portuguese tax system, in the context of which was seen as selective.121 In 
essence, the measure was considered a state aid as it involved a regional selectivity, a reduced 
tax rate that could not be regarded as general measure. Portugal claimed that the tax reductions 
are justified by the nature and structure of the Portuguese tax system. Such measures were 
aimed at redistribution of the tax burden in accordance with the objective differences between 
the taxpayers in mainland Portugal and the Azores, an argument rejected by ECJ.122  
 
ECJ clarified in UGT-Rioja the autonomy criteria for the infra-state bodies. The case concerned 
the Basque historical territories, which in 2005 introduced lower rate of corporation tax and other 
corporate tax incentives for entities with tax residence in the Basque territories. The question 
was whether the undertakings established in the Basque territories benefit from selective 
advantages in comparison with other undertakings established in the rest of Spain. ECJ stated 
that it is for the national court to determine the autonomy of the infra-state entity in the taxation 
area, but offered clarification: the infra-state body implementing the tax measures must enjoy 
institutional, procedural and economic autonomy so the measure would not being treated as 
selective:123  
 
● A measure is treated as being introduced by a regional body with institutional autonomy 
where such status is guaranteed within the constitutional framework of the country. With 
an examination of the relevant constitutional provisions, such an autonomy was 
                                               
121 Azores, paras 67-68 and 78-79; Opinion of AG, para 54 
122 Azores, para 41, 105  
123 Azores, para 67 
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considered to be accorded to the Azores within Portugal, and to Gibraltar within the 
United Kingdom.124 Gibraltar’s right to set autonomously from the United Kingdom the 
rules of its own tax system was, strangely, disputed by the Commission in the 
proceedings;125 
 
● Under the procedural autonomy, the decision should not be affected by the central 
government, nor should the government be able to interfere with the decision.126  
 
● Economical and financial autonomy exists where the financial consequences of the tax 
measure cannot be offset by incentives granted by the central government in other 
regions.127  A direct causal link established between the infra-state body tax measure 
and the financial assistance offered by central government in another region excludes 
such autonomy.128  
 
On the basis of this case-law, the Commission found that the tax reductions introduced by the 
local authorities in St. Martin met the three ‘autonomy’ criteria and the tax advantage was not 
considered selective. Here, the measures were assessed against the tax system of St. Martin, 
not the whole of France.129  
 
Gibraltar’s ‘engineered’ tax regime was considered in breach of the state aid rules under the 
new methodology adopted by the ECJ. However, it did not imply inconsistency on behalf of the 
Court, as the Azores and UGT-Rioja regional autonomy criteria were fully endorsed. Gibraltar’s 
tax regime was, in ultimis, considered materially selective, as it awarded advantage to the 
offshore companies with reference to Gibraltar’s tax law, not that of the United Kingdom.130 
Arguably, the scope of Article 107(1) TFEU material selectivity criterion was expanded with 
Gibraltar. The Commission welcomed the judgment as ‘landmark’, a development which 
suggests that the extensive interpretation of Article 107(1) further limits the tax policy powers of 
the member states.131  
                                               
124 Azores, para 70, Gibraltar para 106,107  
125 Decision 2005/261/EC, para 123  
126 UGT-Rioja, paras 96-100 
127 UGT-Rioja, paras 133,134 
128 Draft Notice, at [152]  
129 Commission Decision of 29 September 2010 in State Aid N325/2008OJ, (2009) OJ C264/3  
130 Lyons, B.T.R. (1) 2012 
131 Hancher (2012), p. 357, op.cit.  
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V. R&D related state aid and Patent Boxes  
 
Under the patent box, domestic legislation provides for beneficial corporation tax treatment132 on 
the profits derived from qualifying IP rights (patents from the UK or EU/EEA). The qualifying 
criteria include the legal ownership and the company’s activity related to the development of the 
IP, while the qualifying incomes include different patent rights.133  
 
Some tax incentives may qualify for one of the exemptions under Article 108 TFEU, provided 
they don’t affect the level playing field contrary to the common interest. The Commission has 
also accepted a number of R&D tax incentive schemes that meet the conditions for aid 
compatibility as laid down in the EU Framework for state aid for research and development and 
innovation.134 Aid measures that may be compatible with the internal market include: aid for 
R&D projects, aid for feasibility studies, aid for innovation activities etc.135  
 
The aim of the R&D incentives is to strengthen the scientific base of the EU which complements 
the competition policy. Therefore, the state aid for R&D should serve as an incentive for 
companies to engage in R&D activities. The ‘incentive effect’ is presumed for SMEs, but the 
member states must demonstrate that the aid is necessary as an incentive for large 
undertakings and that under no circumstances constitutes operating aid.136  
The Patent boxes are often considered an area of harmful tax competition among EU member 
states as defined by the Code of Conduct. Thus, the tax advantages granted to multinationals 
under these schemes, which lack economic substance, may be challenged under both EU state 
aid rules. As R&D related state aid for large companies is not presumed, even if the Patent Box 
regime is notified and approved by the European Commission137, electing in should be 
considered only for profits specifically related to the patented technology. Artificially high patent 
box claims can also be targeted under specific anti-avoidance provisions.  
 
 
                                               
132 In the UK, the effective corporation tax rate by 2017 will be 10%, with a proportion of the available 
benefits ranging from 60% in 2013 to 100% in 2017; HMRC 
133 CTA 2010 s.357.B; Corporate Intangibles Research and Development Manual  
134 Commission Communication: Framework for state aid for research and development and innovation 
C(2014) 3282 of 21 May 2014  
135 Idem, para 40 
136 Idem 
137 Supra  
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VI. Tax rulings - administrative discretion as state aid 
 
Let us look at the Netherlands’ definition of tax rulings, country with long established system of 
tax rulings, which has been historically attractive destination for multinational enterprises: 
“Advance rulings are advanced opinion from the tax authorities that is binding on them and 
which describes the tax consequences for multinationals on cross border situations.”138 The 
scope of the tax rulings is somewhat controversial as to whether it provides for increased legal 
certainty of the taxpayers or it allows for safe tax planning of the multinationals. This instrument 
is now used by almost all OECD member states and offers taxpayers the possibility to address 
a tax administration with the request for binding opinion on the tax treatment of a particular legal 
and factual situation. In the early 1990’s, the IRS introduced advanced pricing agreements, 
which are a specific category in the tax rulings system related to transfer- pricing. According to 
the IRS, advanced pricing agreement is a binding agreement between the taxpayer and IRS 
regarding prospective application of the transfer pricing methodologies to a specific set of 
international transactions between related parties.139  
 
Tax rulings are closely connected with administrative discretion. Tax legislation leaving to the 
tax administration the discretion whether to grant the incentive amounts to prima facie state 
aid.140 Revenue administrations can exercise their discretionary powers by binding themselves 
on the applicable tax rate, tax base, carry-forward of losses, transfer-prices etc.141 Such 
examples may involve state aid as the tax treatment of a particular taxpayer is often negotiated 
with the revenue.142 ECJ described in Kimberly Clark that discretion is involved where the 
latitude of the tax administration goes ‘beyond simple management of tax revenue by reference 
to objective criteria’.143  
 
Tax authorities have discretionary powers where the rules are vaguely formulated, leaving them 
with wide margin of discretion as to the conditions for granting the incentive etc. ECJ in P Oy 
addressed the Finnish loss trafficking rules and the question whether the latitude enjoyed by the 
Finnish tax authorities to authorise the deduction of losses can constitute selective tax 
                                               
138 As defined by Netherlands’ law, in Meussen et al. (2002) EC Tax Review, 11, 4-10. p. 23  
139 Romano (2002), p.21, op.cit.  
140 Territorio Historico de Alava, paras 29-35 
141 Schoen in Hancher (2012), p. 355, op.cit.  
142 Decision 2005/77/EC OJ L29/24, paras 55 et seq.   
143 France v Commission (Kimberly Clark), paras 23-24  
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advantage and thus accord state aid state aid.144 Here, selectivity was established in relation to 
the wide margin of discretion enjoyed by the Finnish Revenue, where the tax advantage was 
granted in accordance with criteria unrelated to the tax system, such as encouraging 
employment. This amounts to discretion which can potentially favour certain undertakings or 
production of certain goods.145   
 
The Commission set the boundaries of the ‘acceptability’ of the tax rulings in the Draft Notice 
(2014). Thus, rulings which merely interpret the tax law and don’t deviate from the case-law are 
considered not to give rise to presumption of state aid.146  On the other hand, the Commission 
elaborates that tax rulings of member states which leave large discretion to the tax authorities or 
don’t publish the tax rulings, presumably involve state aid.147 The Commission observes that 
only some member states publish their tax rulings, and the reason behind this non-transparent 
practice rightfully raises concerns about selective application of the tax rules.148   
 
Tax rulings implicate selectivity where: 
 The tax rulings involve discretion on behalf of the Revenue; 
 National or international tax law provisions are ‘favourably applied’ by the tax rulings; 
 The tax rulings are not accessible for undertakings in equal legal or factual situation; and 
 The tax rulings award lower effective tax rates contrary to the statutory tax rate 
applicable in the country.149 
 
On that note, in June 2014 the Commission announced opening of three state aid investigations 
in the transfer pricing arrangements and the corporate taxation of Apple, Starbucks and Fiat 
Finance and Trade. The Commission suspects that these multinationals received beneficial 
treatment, using the tax rulings system to approve inappropriate transfer pricing 
arrangements.150  
 
                                               
144 P Oy [2013] 
145 P Oy [2013], para 27 
146 Draft Notice on the notion on state aid (2014), para 175 
147 Idem 
148 To the knowledge of the author, only Belgium publishes its rulings on the web page 
http://www.ruling.be/; The Commission observes that some states have circulars or other acts which 
regulate the extent of the ruling practices, Draft Notice para 174 
149 Draft Notice on the notion on state aid (2014), para 177; The opposite would obviously qualify a tax 
ruling as acceptable, para 175 Draft Notice 
150 IP/14/663 of 11 June 2014, European Commission 
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The Commission argues that multinational companies have received incompatible state aid 
which involves discretion by improper application OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines.  
Effectively, some entities haven’t been rewarded at arm’s length, i.e. under market terms. In 
such a situation, where the tax authorities accept a calculation of the taxable base which does 
not insist on arm’s length remuneration between the related parties, that would position them in 
more favourable position within the internal market, and the tax advantage thus gained may 
amount to state aid.151  
 
In line with its decisional practice, the Commission claims that the tax rulings issued by the 
Netherlands, Ireland and Luxembourg contain tax arrangements which may amount to state aid.  
 
This EU inquiry involves the following rulings: 
1. The individual ruling issued by Ireland on the taxable profit allocated to the Irish 
incorporated subsidiaries of the US technology multinational Apple - Apple Sales 
International and Apple Operations Europe;  
2. The advance rulings issued by Luxembourg on the calculation on the taxable base in 
Luxembourg for the financing activities of Fiat Finance and Trade;152 
3. The advance ruling issued by the Netherlands on the taxable base in the Netherlands for 
the manufacturing activities of Starbucks Manufacturing EMEA BV.153 
 
VI (a) Misapplication of the transfer-pricing methods as state aid 
 
Transfer-pricing, alongside with administrative discretion related to the tax rulings, was identified 
by the Commission as the most contentious issue in the corporate taxation of the multinationals. 
The modality of the application of the transfer-pricing rules before has been interpreted as giving 
rise to state aid. It is clear from the decisional practice of the Commission and the ECJ case-law 
that whole tax regimes of the member states are capable of awarding selective tax advantages, 
by way of administrative discretion. This was considered to allow for misapplication of the cost-
plus method by the national revenues, which amounted to beneficial corporate tax treatment to 
                                               
151 Idem 
152 Idem 
153 These rulings have not been published by the respective tax administrations  
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certain multinationals in the past.154 The cases involved the pricing of the intra-group services 
provided by the coordination centres and the finance companies.155  
 
VI (b). OECD: Cost-plus as traditional transfer-pricing method 
 
OECD Transfer-Pricing Guidelines don’t require the tax administration or the company to 
perform analyses in order to determine proper intra-group remuneration under more than one 
method, given that the cost-plus method is considered a traditional method in for determining 
whether the commercial or financial transactions within the group are at arm’s length.156 
Moreover, multinationals are free to apply methods not endorsed by OECD provided those 
satisfy the arm’s length standard, but cost-plus would remain most useful where controlled 
transactions involve provision of services.157  
 
Article 9 of the OECD Model, detailed in the OECD TP Guidelines, suggests that pricing of intra-
group services is best assessed using the cost-plus method. Moreover, the revised Guidelines 
place all of the methods on equal footing, whilst the traditional methods are preferable.158 US tax 
law requires the multinationals to select ‘the best method’ depending on the nature of their 
commercial operations, which makes the compliance more difficult.159 OECD does not 
suggesting use of ‘best method’, as required by the IRC. Given that OECD leaves a choice of a 
transfer-pricing method, it should be acceptable that transfer prices would vary within certain, 
acceptable range. This is obviously important, as the Commission claims that the level of 
taxation borne by the multinationals would have been different, if i.e. Luxembourg had applied 
traditional methods.160  
 
 
 
 
                                               
154 Decision 2003/438/EC 
155 Supra 
156 OECD TP Guidelines, p. 60-62  
157 Chapter VII of the OECD Manual deals with the transfer-pricing of intra-group services and the 
particularities thereof, whether they have occurred, and how to remunerate them, pointing back to the 
cost plus method., p. 70-71 
158 Miller (2014), p. 362, op.cit.  
159 Cf. IRC S. 482; Compliance under the OECD Guidelines only requires calculations under a single 
method, Miller (2014), p.362  
160 Decision 2003/501/EC on the Luxembourg Coordination Centres, para 49  
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VI (c). European Commission on the cost-plus pricing 
 
The Commission’s point of view on interpreting the OECD standards has been consistent with 
EU’s evolving position over the years. The guidelines for headquarter company regimes (bylaws 
passed under the EU Code of conduct in November 2000), suggested that member states 
should refrain from using cost-plus (or resale-minus) where a comparable uncontrolled price 
could have been obtained.161  In 2014, under the draft Notice, the Commission in line with ECJ 
case law (Forum 187 etc.), noted that the use of fixed-margin in a cost-plus transfer-pricing can 
amount to state aid.162  
 
In the Decision related to transfer-pricing of intra-group services provided by the coordinating 
centres in Luxembourg, the practical implementation of the cost-plus pricing method was 
considered to give rise to a selective tax advantage.163 The Commission assessed the measure 
as granting a state aid by reference to international tax law - the OECD Transfer-Pricing 
Guidelines that do not recommend the use of ‘safe harbours’ such as fixed margin.164 
Luxembourg tax administration on the other hand, consistently applied the minimal mark-up rate 
of 5%, without taking out the economic reality of the transactions between the associated 
parties. Thus, the conduct of the tax administration had the effect of conferring tax advantage to 
the coordination centres making them subjected to lower level of taxation in relation to other 
entities in comparable factual and legal situation.165  
 
The Commission challenged the method used by Luxembourg for taxation of intra-group 
services (cost-plus pricing) on grounds it does not correspond to the taxation methods used in 
other member states where the taxable profit is determined by reference to the income and 
expenses. This could result in advantage in case where an overcharging might give rise to a 
reduction of the burden in other states which will not be offset by corresponding increase in 
Luxembourg. Luxembourg’s Circular 119 established a preferential tax regime applicable to the 
coordination centres (multinational resident limited companies which provide administrative, 
marketing and other services to entities within the group) and involved, in essence, a 5% flat-
                                               
161 ECOFIN Conclusions 13898/00 FISC270 27 November 2000; Cf. Nijkampf considers that the EU 
prohibited the use of cost-plus method, in spite of the political nature of the commitments under the Code 
of conduct; EC Tax Review 10.3 (2001), pp. 147-154. 
162 Draft Notice, para 176 
163 Decision 2003/501/EC of 16 October 2002 on the Luxembourg coordination centres, paras 7-11, 20-21 
164 Idem, para 46 
165 Idem, para 47 
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rate mark-up for intra-group provision services, considered by Luxembourg tax administration a 
rate “reasonable” for this type of service in comparison to free market pricing.166   
 
In the example of the Luxembourg national legislation applicable to the finance companies, for 
corporation tax purposes, the loans granted by the finance companies within the group were 
deemed to generate appropriate trading profit at arm’s length.167 This was fixed at minimum of 
0.125% of the loan, but had the finance company realised greater trading profit, the higher 
trading profit forms the tax base for corporation tax purposes.168 Therefore, the national 
legislation which implemented OECD transfer-pricing guidelines did not deviate favourable from 
the international standards, and the Commission accepted that.169 However, Luxembourg 
systematically granted the minimum rate, which did constitute a tax advantage for the MNEs 
and was considered an operating aid.170  
 
In Forum 187, ECJ affirmed Commission’s assessment of the tax regime for the Belgian 
coordination that the flat-rate assessment of income under the cost-plus method constituted an 
advantage for the purposes of Article 107 TFEU.171  
 
To sum up, Commission’s decisional practice and the ECJ case-law suggest that the 
systematically application of fixed-margins (minimum mark-up) by the revenue administration 
amounted to selective tax advantages.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
166 Decision 2003/501/EC, para 48 
167 Decision 2003/438/EC on the Luxembourg Finance Companies, para 10 
168 Idem, para 20  
169 Idem, para 40 
170 Idem, paras 43 and 58, Operating aid, see fn. 34 
171 Decision 2009/809/EC, paras 80-82; Forum 187, paras 86 to 118  
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VII. Apple’s tax planning in light of Commission’s state aid inquiry  
 
The issues related to the taxation of Apple elaborate the application of the transfer-pricing rules 
by the Irish tax authorities, which according to the Commission involves “significant degree of 
discretion”.172  As this work illustrates (infra), Ireland’s recent changes to tax-residence rules and 
the low effective tax rates guaranteed by the tax rulings seems to support Commission’s 
arguments of involvement of state aid.  
 
VII (a). Irish tax residence rules and US ‘check-the-box’  
 
Apple’s tax planning strategies were revealed at the US Congress hearing held in May 2013.173 
Primarily, Apple does not repatriate the profits earned from its foreign subsidiaries. US uses the 
credit method, which means that the 35% of corporation tax should be normally reduced for the 
amount of taxes paid abroad. However, due to the fact that US corporation tax is one of the 
highest in the world, even after double tax relief, the amount of payable tax is still high, which 
disincentives the repatriation of foreign dividends.174  
 
The iTax175 structure also uses the mismatching tie-breaker rules regarding the tax residence, 
thus establishing entities which are ‘stateless’ (not resident in any jurisdiction) for tax purposes. 
US uses the ‘place of incorporation’ test to determine the tax residence, while Ireland uses both 
the place of incorporation and place of effective management test. However, under the Ireland- 
US double tax treaty; there are exceptions to this rule which Apple exploits. US considers tax 
resident only companies incorporated in the US, while Ireland makes an exception for 
companies incorporated in Ireland which are controlled by residents of a country which Ireland 
entered into double tax treaty. In such a case this company will not be considered Irish tax 
resident176   
 
Apple Operations International (AOI), a subsidiary incorporated in Ireland owns the Apple Retail 
Holdings, a company that runs Apple retail stores in Europe.  In the course of the period 2009 - 
2012, AOI received dividends from other Apple group members of nearly 30 billion US dollars, 
                                               
172 IP/14/663 of 11 June 2014, European Commission  
173 Testimony of Apple’s Tax Director at Senate’s Permanent Subcommittee Apple Enquiry (2013) 
174 Miller (2014), p. 549, op.cit.  
175 Ting, B.T.R. 1 (2014)  
176 Miller (2014), p. 359, op.cit. 
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but did not pay any corporation tax.177 The effect is that AOI does not pay any corporation tax on 
the received dividends or interest, since it is not tax resident in Ireland. 
 
These dividend distributions from the European subsidiaries will not be taxed in the US, and 
they are not attributable to the US parent under the US CFC legislation.178 As a  result of these 
notorious ‘check the box’ rules, Apple subsidiaries can elect to be treated as ‘look-through’ for 
tax purposes (in effect treated like branches of AOI), which means that the dividends will be 
seen for US tax purpose as trading (business) income attributable to AOI Ireland, instead of 
passive income.179 Thus, under the US check the box rules, the dividends earned by the 
subsidiaries are treated as active business income which is not caught under the US CFC 
rules.180  
 
In light of the EU pressure on Ireland about its role in facilitating Apple’s aggressive tax 
planning, and the risk of being labelled (yet again181) as tax haven, Ireland amended the rules 
on tax residence in 2013. Under the new provisions, Irish-incorporated subsidiaries of US 
multinationals should be considered tax resident in Ireland.182  
 
But, there are two important exceptions that render the new rule virtually ineffective. For 
companies incorporated in Ireland before October 2013, the new residence rules are effective 
from 1 January 2015, which leaves Apple with significant time to rearrange its tax structure. 
Secondly, the place of effective management rules can be easily manipulated, by replacing the 
US resident directors and moving the board meetings outside the US, which will make the 
company effectively managed outside the US.183  
 
Ting argues that the new Irish tax residence rules are drafted in such a way to complement the 
new US CFC rules in providing safe harbour for the Irish incorporated US subsidiaries. Under 
the modified US CFC rules, the income retained by CFC from intra-group sales is excluded if it 
                                               
177 Supra, fn. 174  
178 IRC, US Code Part III, Subpart F (S.951-965) 
179 Ting, B.T.R. 1 (2014) 
180 Idem 
181 Ting, B.T.R. 2014 (3), pp. 237-247: “[i]t appears that the definition enacted in 1999 was designed to 
allow many Irish-incorporated companies, especially subsidiaries of US MNEs, to remain as non-
residents of Ireland,...,which have recently been exposed in various US and UK hearings.”  
182 Finance Act Ireland (No.2) 2013 s. 39 
183 Ting, B.T.R. 2014 (3), fn. [182] 
183 Idem 
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comes from resident of a treaty country and the CFC is subject to tax abroad of at least 12.5% 
(which coincides with the statutory CT rate in Ireland).184 Avi-Yonah calls this concurrence “an 
invitation to BEPS”.185  Baker argues that it is the dysfunctional nature of the US tax system that 
should be primarily addressed as part of the efforts to make the BEPS project successful: 
abandoning ‘check the box’ and making subpart F rules (CFC legislation) effective once 
again.186 
 
VII. (b). Apple’s effective tax rate in Ireland- discretionary tax rulings 
 
Another aspect of Apple’s tax planning is the low effective corporation tax rate in Ireland 
applicable to the Irish incorporated US-subsidiaries, which, in the year 2011 went as low as 
2.2%.187 Such preferential treatment could only be accorded by a discretionary tax ruling, having 
in mind that the statutory CT rate of 12,5%. The Commission, though, stated that they 
investigate the individual which treats Apple preferentially, not the applicable rate itself.188   
 
It appears that Ireland’s practices might be rightfully seen by the Commission as indication of 
state aid. Its recently amended tax residence rules, which matched US rules in rendering the 
Irish incorporated US subsidiaries ‘stateless’ perpetuated these mismatches. This could be 
analysed in light of the Code of conduct and the harmful tax practices. Admittedly, international 
tax rules give ample space for arbitrage opportunities. Alongside with the low effective tax rates 
secured by the tax rulings, the Commission would make its case, which would probably result in 
recovery of unlawful state aid.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
184 Ting, B.T.R. 2014 (3), fn. [182] 
185 Avi-Yonah, Tax Notes Int'l 73, no. 12 (2014): 1054-7 
186 P. Baker, BEPS: Success or failure?, Tax Journal 1226 (2014)  
187 Average Tax Rate of Irish Incorporated Companies, page (iii), Effective Rates of Corporate Tax in 
Ireland (2014), op. cit.  
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VIII. Luxembourg – tax treatment of finance companies (transparency issues) 
 
Commission’s enquiry of the tax rulings related to the taxable income of Fiat Finance and Trade 
faced lack of cooperation by the Luxembourg tax authorities. They failed to provide detailed 
information as to the information injections adopted by the Commission on 24 March 2014, 
which triggered infringement proceedings for breach of EU law against Luxembourg. 
Luxembourg referred the case to ECJ and lodged an action for annulment of the injunctions, 
citing doubts about the legality of such requests. 189   
 
Presumably, the Commission will treat the case in line with its decisional practice on the 
taxation of the multinational finance companies and the criteria established in state aid case-
law, in particular Forum 187.   
 
However, important aspect of the state aid inquiries is the transparency, and the lack thereof. 
Member states have repeatedly declared their commitment to transparency of their tax affairs, in 
particular regarding state aid the exchange of information regarding the tax rulings. But when 
the transparency is lacking, the EU institutions are not able to exercise their powers to inquiry 
the tax measure. In the recent P Oy judgment, ECJ repeated that state aid would be presumed 
where tax administrations enjoy ‘latitude’ which goes beyond simple management of the tax 
rules.  
 
In accordance with the Primarolo Report, member states agreed to greater transparency in the 
area of tax rulings.190 In particular, they agreed that advance pricing agreements, or rulings 
related to transfer-pricing will be notified to the concerned member states. This is without 
prejudice to the work of EU and OECD on automatic exchange of information and increased 
transparency. 
 
In similar vein, IRS learnt that Caterpillar shifted $8 million to Switzerland in the period 2000 to 
2012, and deferred or avoided US taxes totalling $2.4 billion, only when such data were made 
public at the Senate hearing in April 2014, illustrating the lack of transparency in the taxation of 
the multinational companies.191   
 
                                               
189 Idem 
190 ECOFIN Council conclusions, 1 December 1997, 12530/98 FISC164  
191 R. Avi-Yonah, (2014), op.cit.  
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The latest inquiries by the European Commission coincide with BEPS action points 12 and 13, 
which address the need to draft domestic law mandatory disclosure rules for aggressive 
planning, and to develop rules regarding transfer pricing documentation in order to enhance 
transparency for tax administrations. The lack of transparency undermines the proper 
administration of the arm’s length principle, thus encouraging BEPS practices, which, arguably, 
are the corollary of the EU state aid inquiry.192   
 
IX. Transfer-pricing revisited  
 
In times of fiscal austerity, the tax treatment of the multinationals would be under kept under 
close scrutiny of the Commission. Given that the transfer-pricing is the obvious problem related 
to both the state aid inquires and the international taxation at large, it seems logical to look into 
alternatives.  
 
Many authors have suggested fundamental overhaul of the international tax rules, where the 
taxation of the cross-border operating entities will follow the fiscal reality and establish a form of 
unitary taxation, or formulary apportionment.193 The corporate law reality is that subsidiaries of 
the parent companies are separate legal entities and the arm’s length principle is based on the 
legal separation of the corporate group members, while in reality they operate as single entity.194 
If we acknowledge the ‘unprecedented interconnectedness’ of the multinationals, we thus 
confirm the divergence between the legal reality and the fiscal fiction.  
 
The diminishing acceptance of the traditional international tax order based on the OECD Model 
double tax treaties is accompanied by rejection of the traditional transfer-pricing methods195 and 
calls by the US multinationals for partial or full implementation of formulary apportionment as 
replacement of the arm’s length principle.196 
 
                                               
192 OECD BEPS Action Plan (2013) 
193 Philip Baker at fn. [187]; Richard Vann (2010) concludes that while the arm’s length is inappropriate 
transfer pricing concept, it remains the only viable solution at the moment, as the formulary apportionment 
is taken hostage by the bilateral treaty network; Reuven Avi-Yonah (2014) has argued for hybrid model in 
allocating multinationals’ global income: formulary apportionment for the profits arising from intangibles, 
and arm’s length for profits arising from physical goods trading; Angharad Miller (2014) at p.568 claims 
that the resistance to the formulary apportionment would hinder the success of the BEPS project  
194 Wallace (2002), op.cit.   
195 Baker, Tax Journal 1226 (2014) 
196 Korb, Tax Journal 1226, (2014)  
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Under the EU-proposed formulary apportionment (CCCTB), the multinationals would calculate 
the profits stemming from their cross-border EU business operations on a commonly agreed tax 
base. The profits would thus be allocated to the member states on basis of the formula which 
would take into account different factors such as sales, employment data, assets etc. The 
consolidation would render the profit shifting obsolete, with less incentive to manipulate the 
transfer-pricing under the arm’s length standard within the EU.197 Arguably, diverse tax rates 
can encourage profit shifting outside the EU.198 A major weakness of the CCCTB proposal 
remains the absence of the intangibles from the formula. Given the mobile nature of such 
assets, there will be in incentive to manipulate the formula by moving the intangibles to other EU 
member states with lower tax rates.199 Therefore, the success of the EU formulary 
apportionment reform depends on the willingness of the member states to harmonise their 
corporation tax rates.  
 
X. Conclusion  
 
The Commission has challenged the favourable deviations from the arm’s length standard in 
state aid inquiries.  Apple’s tax structure is an illustration of the tax planning opportunities which 
explore the lacunae in the international tax order. Reading what lies behind member states’ 
coinciding commitment to both tax competition and the BEPS project, ECJ expanded the scope 
of Article 107(1) TFEU to prevent ‘avoidance of EU state aid law’.200 
 
The present momentum is fuelled by the unprecedented public interest in the tax affairs of the 
multinationals in light of the growing need for revenue in the era of the austerity measures.201 
But, paying one’s fair share has become more of an ethical, than legal matter. The underlying 
issue, essentially, is the suitability of the arm’s length (bilateral) standard to deal with the 
(multilateral) transfer-pricing.   
 
As a result of the reputational risks, Starbucks pledged a £10 million voluntary corporation tax 
payment.202 P. Baker argues that a greater revenue contribution by the multinationals may 
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amount to failure of the BEPS project, if the higher tax burden was passed on to the general 
public, especially on the expense of the developing countries.203  
 
The state aid rules are arguably an instrument for the Commission to supervise, under close 
scrutiny, not only the substantive tax policy and law, but its implementation and the 
administrative treatment of the direct business taxation. This should provoke caution for the 
multinational companies. Limiting member states’ competence to issue (discretionary) tax 
rulings puts the tax planning in a new perspective.  
 
In light of the wide scope of EU state aid rules, the Commission, subject to review by ECJ, can 
declare whole tax regimes unlawful. Following Gibraltar, a tax measure can be considered to 
award selective advantages to certain undertakings by reference to the effects of the tax system 
(de facto material selectivity).  
 
If the practice of EU supervision over the transfer-pricing compliance activity of the national tax 
administrations becomes settled case-law, this would arguably amount to fewer rulings, and 
member states’ revenues and multinational companies would prefer going to national courts, to 
protect themselves from the Commission examination over the transfer-pricing treatment of 
certain cases.204  As demonstrated in Forum 187, EU state aid law offers protection to 
multinational companies, with considerable prospects of successful legitimate expectation 
claims. 
These trends illustrate that the EU insists on excluding discretionary practices and on 
application of the tax legislation in broadest possible terms.  
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